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Does aversion to the sucker’s payoff matter in public goods games? 
 
Abstract 
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the 
sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to 
disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where 
people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to 
the  public  good  under  this  ‘protective’  design  are  significantly  higher  and  interact  with 
expectations on other individuals’ contribution to the public good. Some research extensions 
are suggested. 
 
Keywords: experiments, public good, sucker’s payoff, assurance  
JEL classifications: C72, C91, H41 
 
 




Une des raisons à la faible contribution volontaire aux biens publics est l’aversion au sucker’s 
payoff (coopération individuelle quand les autres font défection). Afin de distinguer l’effet de 
cette aversion d’autres causes, nous réalisons une expérience de contribution à un bien public 
dans laquelle les joueurs ont une assurance contre le risque de sucker’s payoff. Les résultats 
montrent que l’assurance augmente les contributions de manière directe mais également de 
manière indirecte à travers les anticipations des individus sur les contributions des autres. 
 
Mots-clefs : économie expérimentale, bien public, sucker’s payoff, assurance 
Classifications JEL : C72, C91, H41 
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Does aversion to the sucker’s payoff really matter in public goods games? 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
A frequent explanation of low levels of contributions in public good games is the individual 
fear of  getting the so-called sucker’s payoff or outcome, that occurs  when the individual 
contributes  while  the  other  player  defects.  The  aversion  to  the  sucker’s  payoff  has  been 
notably introduced in the analysis of public goods with threshold effects. In this case, the 
agent does not contribute for the production of a public good because he fears that the good 
will not be produced because too many other players will defect. Given that the production of 
the  public  good  requires  a  minimum  level  of  contributions,  if  the  contributions  are 
insufficient,  the  good  will  not  be  produced  and  the  individual’s  contribution  will  feel  he 
squandered his contribution (Sen, 1967; Runge, 1984; Schmidtz, 1991; Wiener and Doescher, 
1991). 
Even if the outcomes seem similar between free riding and sucker’s payoff aversion –that is 
reduced contributions to public goods– the drivers are different. Indeed, free riding behavior 
is an opportunistic behavior where the individual seeks to consume more than his fair share of 
a public resource while the sucker’s payoff behavior is a priori non-opportunistic and results 
from concerns regarding others’ behaviors. While this aversion is exacerbated in the case of 
public  goods  with  threshold  effects,  we  contend  that  it  remains  an  impediment  to  higher 
contributions, even when there is no threshold effect. In a survey, Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965)  showed  that  cooperation  rates  in  prisoner’s  dilemmas  increase  when  the  ‘sucker’ 
payoff decreases. The ‘strong [emphasis added] desire to avoid being a sucker’ is supported 
by an empirical regularity that ‘when a manipulation (…) has the effect of increasing the 
likelihood  that  the  group’s  goal  will  be  achieved,  subjects  are  more  likely  to  cooperate’ 
(Wiener and Doescher, 1991; see also Taschian et al., 1984). Using experimental games, Fehr 
and Gachter (2000) demonstrate that people are willing to punish free-riding –even if it is 
costly for them– in order to avoid getting the sucker’s outcome. 
Rather than advocating for assurance schemes or contracts from a theoretical viewpoint (e.g., 
Schmidtz, 1991), we question their effectiveness to improve the funding of public goods. In 
order to disentangle the effect of the sucker’s payoff aversion from other factors on the level 
of  contributions,  we  design  a  public  good  game  where  participants  are  partially  insured 
against  defection  by  other  players.  The  contribution  level  to  public  goods  when  a  partial Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-08 
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assurance  mechanism  is  implemented  has  not  been  investigated  in  the  literature.  In  other 
words,  our  paper  answers  to  the  following  question:  does  the  provision  of  an  assurance 
mechanism lead to higher levels of contribution to public goods and to what extent? We 
report two main results. First, we corroborate that aversion to the sucker’s payoff matters in 
overall contribution to public goods and the implementation of an assurance mechanism has a 
positive  impact  on  the  individual’s  contribution.  Second,  the  assurance  mechanism  also 
affects the individual’s expectations regarding the contributions of other participants. As all 
other agents also benefit from the same assurance mechanism, their incentive to defect is 
equally reduced. This effect simultaneously (i) reinforces the positive effect of the assurance 
mechanism at the individual’s level as the probability to end up with the sucker’s payoff is 
reduced, ceteris paribus but (ii) also decreases the overall individual’s contribution because 
he  expects  that  given  that  other  players  will  contribute  more,  he  can  contribute  less. 
Ultimately, the overall effect of implementing an assurance mechanism on the individual’s 
contribution remains positive. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment and 
stipulates the theoretical predictions. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 
concludes and provides some research extensions.  
 
2.  Experimental design and implementation  
In this section we present the experimental design and the theoretical predictions given our 
treatments and our choice of parameters for the experiment. 
 
2.1  Basic design 
We use two treatments namely the Reference treatment that corresponds to a standard public 
good game and the Assurance treatment where we provide subjects with an insurance against 
the risk of getting the sucker’s payoff. In the Reference treatment, subjects are endowed with 
20 tokens they allocate between a private investment which earns one euro per token and a 
public investment which earns 0.4 euros per token as in any standard public good experiment. 
Given  other  players’  contribution  i c- ,  player  i   chooses  the  level  of  contribution  i c   that 
maximizes the following payoff function: 
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1
( , ) 20 0.4 20 0.6 0.4
n
i i i k i i
k
u c c c c c c - -
=
= - + = - + ∑  
In  the  Reference  treatment,  the  Nash  equilibrium  is  to  contribute  nothing  and  the  social 
optimum to contribute all the endowment. The reason for low contributions may lie in free 
riding behavior but also in the aversion to the sucker payoff. To distinguish these effects, we 
design a second treatment. 
In  the  Assurance  treatment,  subjects  have  the  same  payoff  function  as  in  the  Reference 
treatment except that another payoff function (alternative payoff) substitutes to the standard 
payoff if the contribution of the other players in the group is too low. Given other players’ 
contribution  i c- , player  i  chooses the level of contribution  i c  that maximizes the following 
payoff function: 
( , ) [(20 0.6 0.4 );(20 0.3 ) ] i i i i i v c c Max c c c - - = - + -  
The Nash equilibrium of this game is still to contribute nothing and the social optimum to 
contribute all. However, the worst payoff for player  i  that is to be the only one to contribute 
(“sucker’s payoff”) is now relatively better,  ( ,0) 20 0.3 i i v c c = - . In the Reference treatment, 
this worst payoff is  i i c c u 6 . 0 20 ) 0 , ( - = .  
 
2.2.  Predictions 
Figure 1 displays (i) in plain lines, player i ’s payoff as a function of his own contribution and 
depending on the contribution of the three other players and (ii) in dotted lines, the player  i ’s 
alternative payoff as a function of his own contribution. 
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Figure  1:  Player  i’s  payoff  as  a  function  of  his  own  contribution  in  the  Reference 
treatment (with increasing levels of contribution of the three other players – plain lines) 
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First, notice that all the payoffs functions in the Reference treatment have the same slope (-
0.6) and are upward shifted with  an increase of the other players’  contributions. Second, 
notice that the alternative payoff scheme has a negative lower slope of -0.3 and is independent 
of  the  other  players’  contribution.  In  other  words,  it  constitutes  a  partial  and  imperfect 
assurance mechanism against non or too weak contributions by other players.  Third, in the 
Reference  treatment,  we  clearly  see  the  Nash  equilibrium  for  player  i:  whatever  the 
contribution of the other players, payoff is maximized for a zero individual contribution. 
Several cases appear revealing player  i ’s strategy in the Assurance treatment as compared to 
the Reference treatment: 
(i) When  0 i c- = , the alternative payoff is always higher than the Reference payoff. If player i 
has an aversion to the sucker payoff, then contributions should be higher in the Assurance 
treatment as compared to the Reference treatment. 
(ii) When  15 i c- ³ , the payoff of player i in the Reference treatment is always higher than the 
alternative  payoff.  Thus,  whatever  the  contribution  of  the  other  players,  player  i  should 
display the same type of strategy in the Assurance and Reference treatments. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-08 
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(iii) When 0 15 i c- < < , the lines representing the Reference payoff and the alternative payoff 
cross each other. If player i is a relatively big contributor to the public good ( 4 3 i i c c- > ), 
then the Assurance treatment provides higher payoffs than the Reference treatment. However, 
if player i is a relatively small contributor ( 4 3 i i c c- £ ), the Assurance treatment is equivalent 
to the Reference treatment. In a pure ‘homo economicus’ model, the Assurance mechanism 
should play no role even when  0 15 i c- < < . Non contribution remains the dominant strategy. 
However, with other models of behavior where human beings are not ‘pure egoists’ (e.g., 
Croson, 2007), the Assurance mechanism will play a role. What behavior can we expect? By 
providing an assurance against the sucker payoff to all participants, the Assurance mechanism 
leads the individual to anticipate that others will contribute more. This anticipation can exert 
an influence in two opposite ways. On the one hand, if the individual exhibits reciprocal 
preferences, he will contribute more to match the higher contributions of other participants. 
On the other hand, if the individual exhibits altruistic preference that can be crowded out by 
expectations that other participants will contribute at higher levels, he will decrease his own 
contribution.  In  sum,  in  addition  to  the  direct  effect  of  the  Assurance  mechanism  on  the 
individual i , there is also an indeterminate indirect effect through the individual’ expectations 
on the contribution levels of other participants. 
 
3.  Experimental results 
We first present the sample and the sessions, then some summary statistics and finally the 
econometric results. 
 
3.1.  Sample and sessions 
The experiment has been performed at the ENGREF (Nancy, France) and gathered a sample 
of 64 students. Subjects were randomly distributed among groups of four players. In each 
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Table 1: Organized sessions 
Session  Treatment  Number of groups  Number of participants 
1  Reference  4  16 
2  Reference  4  16 
3  Assurance  4  16 
4  Assurance  4  16 
 
3.2.  Sample statistics 
The  average  group  contribution  is  22.625  tokens  (standard  deviation:  18.226)  for  the 
Reference treatment  and 27.863 (standard deviation: 15.532) for the Assurance treatment. 
Figure 2 gives a box plot representation of the average group contribution over the periods 
and  reveals  a  higher  median  for  the  groups  in  the  Assurance  treatment.  A  two-sample 
Wilcoxon  rank-sum  test  is  performed  to  test  for  a  difference  of  distribution  of  group 
contributions  between  the  two  treatments.  The  results  suggests  group  contributions  were 
higher in the Assurance treatment at a 1% significance level (z= -6.258). 
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The statistical analysis does not take into account the panel structure of the data. We take it 
into account in the econometric analysis. 
 
3.3.  Econometric results 
Our data displays a panel structure and we are interested in time-invariant variables such as 
the treatment. The use of a random effect model that includes dummy variables for groups 
shows there is no individual specific effect. Thus, we use an ordinary least square model. 
0 1 2 3 4
1
i -i k k i
k
c Assurance E(c ) Period Group e a a a a a
¹
= + + + + + ∑  
The dependent variable is an individual  i ’s contribution to the public good ( i c ). Independent 
variables are the treatment dummy variable (Assurance) equal to one if the treatment is the 
Assurance treatment, an individual i ’s expectations on what the other three individuals in his 
group  will  contribute  in  the  same  period  t  ( -i E(c )),  the  period  number  (Period),  and  an 
indicator variable for each group minus one (Group).  
Individual i’s expectations on others’ behavior is unobservable. Thus, we used three proxies 
for the variable -i E(c ) (as in Cason and Gangadarhan, 2002 or in Croson, 2007). We consider 
that player i updates his beliefs on others’ behavior on a period by period basis. In the actual 
computation method, we simply use the actual contribution of other players in the group as a 
proxy for individual  i’s expectations.  In the myopic computation method, player  i takes 
account only of the last period without considering the preceding periods. In the non-myopic 
computation method, player i updates his beliefs in period (N+1) by a weighted mean where 
the  behavior  of  others  in  period  (N-1)  is  projected  on  periods  1  to  (N-2).  The  three 
computation  methods  yield  the  same  results.  In  the  article,  we  display  only  the  actual 
computation method. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. 
 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-08 
 
  10 
Table 2: Description and statistics of variables used in the regression analysis  
Variable  Description  #Obs.  Mean 
(SD) 
i c   Individual  i’s  contribution  to  the 
public good 
1280  6.311 
(6.732) 
Assurance  Dummy (=1 if Assurance treatment 
and 0 otherwise) 
1280  0.500 
(0.500) 
-i E(c )  Individual i’s expectations on what 
the  other  three  individuals  in  his 
group will contribute 
1280  18.933 
(13.856) 
 
The  econometric  results  for  all  individuals  are  presented  in  Table  3.  In  line  with  the 
predictions in section 2.2., we have introduced an interaction effect between the treatment and 
the expectations. 
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Table  3:  OLS  regression  of  individual  i's  contribution  to  the  public  good  for  all 
individuals 
  Coefficient  SD  P>|t| 
Assurance  2.160  0.949  0.023 
Expectations  -0.136  0.028  0.000 
Assurance X Expectations  0.068  0.032  0.034 
Period  -0.401  0.033  0.000 
Constant  6.905  0.776  0.000 
(Dummies for group not reported here) 
Nb obs.  1280 
Adj-R2  0.2701 
 
From Table 3, we see that the Period has always a negative effect on individual contributions. 
It is a common result in experimental data. The data analysis shows a positive effect of the 
principal effect of Assurance treatment. The alternative payoff provides participants with an 
assurance against the risk of getting the sucker’s payoff. Individuals are averse to the sucker’s 
payoff. The principal effect of  expectations is negative, although small. According to the 
analysis performed by Croson (2007), this negative correlation associated with positive levels 
of contributions reveals altruism on the part of participants. There is a crowding out effect. 
When participants expect high contributions from others in the group, they will decrease their 
contribution to the public good. Given such behavioral patterns, we predicted an increased 
negative effect of expectations in the Assurance treatment. However, the interaction effect 
between the Assurance treatment and the expectations is positive, although small. When the 
treatment has an assurance device against the sucker payoff, higher expectations will lead to 
higher contributions.  
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4.  Conclusion 
We examined the effect of the aversion to the sucker’s payoff on contribution to public goods, 
using experimental games. Our results confirm that the aversion to the sucker’s payoff plays a 
significant  role  in  explaining  contribution  to  public  goods.  Implementing  an  assurance 
mechanism plays a direct positive role on the individual’s contribution and a positive indirect 
role  through  the  individual’s  expectations  on  other’s  contribution.  When  the  expected 
cooperation  rate  is  relatively  high,  the  assurance  scheme  reinforces  the  positive  role  of 
expectations. 
Our study has limitations that give room for several extensions. For example, our assurance 
mechanism was partial and we do not investigate how different levels of assurance (from no 
assurance to full assurance) can impact on overall contribution to public goods with respect to 
the anticipated cooperation rate. An additional extension relates to the effect of heterogeneous 
agents  (e.g.  big  and  small  contributors  to  public  goods)  on  the  functioning  of  assurance 
schemes. Moreover, in real life, assurance mechanisms can correspond to various devices that 
are likely to impact differently on contributions. We contend that people may, regardless from 
the  end-outcome,  extract  ‘procedural’  utility  from  the  way  the  assurance  scheme  is 
functioning. For instance, the common knowledge of the presence of a sufficient portion of 
individuals willing to contribute to the public goods, regardless of others’ contributions in the 
population  can  provide  a  natural  ‘assurance  mechanism’  preventing  to  some  extent  the 
aversion  to  the  sucker’s  payoff  in  a  different  way  when  compared  to  a  formal  contract 
reimbursing people in case of insufficient overall contributions.  
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